Notes on apologetic approaches and thought life

What is Christian Apologetics? 

Christian Apologetics, in a broad sense, simply means defending Christianity. Thus, all Christians are or should be apologists. But in the literature on scholarly Apologetics, the definition is narrower. There are two broad schools of thought- presuppositionalism and evidentalism/Classical apologetics. A few notes on these schools of thought are below.

I don't personally like the term "Apologetics" as it means different things to different people, and to some it portrays Christianity in a negative light.

Thought Life and Character

I try to be a thinker. That is, I try to think reflectively, rationally and intelligently about all matters of life. When discussing ideas with others, I try to be thoughtful in my approach there as well. Some of my biggest "heroes" in life (for want of a better word) are Christians scholars who I see as humble, reflective, intelligent, whose ideas I think are reasonable and who communicate thoughtfully as well. Good examples: C. Stephen Evans and John Dickson.

Intellectual brilliance is a great thing, but it is not enough- thinking needs to be self reflective. We should be humble in our views, and charitable towards others.

These things could all be teased out through thousands of words.


Notes on Approaches to Apologetics

General thoughts:

- Note problems with all approaches.
- Note good insights to take from each approach.
-  Mixed bag of first order thinking, negative apologetics and evidences.
- First order(Note: I refer to first order in the sense of underlying, big picture, overarching considerations of a foundational nature to do with frameworks) Arguments still provide "evidence" in a broad sense, so you could say that presuppositionalism is still evidentialism at heart, at least to some degree. Secondly, and similarly, Presuppositionalists wouldn't believe in Christianity unless they had Evidence, in a broader still sense of the term.  (Footnote to this; Douglas Wilson claims that assumptions of Christianity are always implicit within evidence arguments etc. So a true presuppositionalist would claim that presuppositionalism is foundational to evidentalism, similar to how I am claiming here that evidence, broadly construed, is necessary foundation for all beliefs, presuppositionalism included).
- Note: Epistemological issues are at the forefront here. C Stephen Evans is the Gold standard.

Presuppositionalist apologetics:

Based theologically on Calvinism.

Good:
- Neutrality is an entirely false notion. It doesn't exist. No one is truly neutral.
- Negative apologetics is vital. It's easier to disprove something or argue against something than it is to erect a case for something to the exclusion of all others. Not only that, but psychology tells us that some people simply refuse evidence which is more evidence itself for point below- the will gets in the way? Example see the amount of atheists who think Jesus didn't exist and that all stories about him are totally mythical (eg: R Price in the book 5 Views on The Historical Jesus). You can convince yourself of anything if you really want to. So both due to psychology and as a strategy, apologetics must strike out other worldviews, not simply build a case for our own.
- Presuppositions and preconditions. Point out the assumptions upon which the other view rests. This could be seen as a vital cog of negative apologetics. But it's also a universal notion of it's own. To reject one belief, another belief must be held.
- The importance of first order thinking. Looking at the Big picture. Before looking at the detail contained in evidentialist arguments, consider questions like: How are we even here? What conditions must exist for us to be here, doing this debate. Universe- law and order, science. People- Rational Thoughts.
- Rationality and persuasiveness is complex. At the very least, person relative. Critical rationalism is more at home within a presuppositionalist framework.

Bad:
- Presupposing something is inevitable but presupposing the entire Bible is a bridge too far. Begs the question. Assumes what it's trying to prove. Some question begging may be inevitable, perhaps (interesting philosophical question to consider) but the entire Bible and/or Christian worldview is a lot to assume!
- Doesn't go far enough. The Resurrection isn't contained within the apologetic. Ironically this is what they are trying to avoid.
- Presuppositionalism claims to provide certainty and that other approaches fail because they only aim for probability. But Certainty is impossible, just like proper neutrality is impossible (especially on the big questions and on existential questions). Although the impossibility of certainty is easier to prove than the impossibility of neutrality. At least with neutrality, people can just claim to be neutral and that leaves a stalemate (even if psychology and/or philosophical argumentation shows that people always have assumptions they come from, and so to truly get neutrality one must dig through a gazillion layers of muck). Whereas with certainty, one can easily come up with a possible objection to almost any argument.

Evidentialism AND Classical apologetics:

Good:
- Positive case. Negative leaves us in nowhere land.

Bad:
- The problem of shifting evidence. Philosophical arguments against this I am very fond of. Similar to Evans. Eg: Wide Accessibility problem. If the best justifications for belief are only available to a select few who are educated enough to understand the best evidence based arguments, what does this say about God? ie: Fine tuning argument didn't exist in it's most persuasive form 100 years ago because fine tuning had not been found. Neither did Kalam Argument. if God is timeless, he will provide various forms. This fits in with the insight that a personal God would provide personal evidence (Moser). Craig wouldn't disagree (1st chap RF, Holy Spirit is warrant on it's own etc) however the evidentialist approach still places too much emphasis on evidence in it's implicit support for simply believing what the current evidence says. It doesn't account for the nature of God very well.
- Much of reverse of "Good" of presupp belongs here. Eg: Neutrality is impossible. Eg: Craig Parton's claim that 98% time devote to positive evidence is ridiculous. Because the will/psychology ensures some remain unpersuaded. And it's easy to find objections to anything. Defense is the best attack sometimes, and too much emphasis on evidence FOR Christianity neglects this point.

Doug Wilson Interview- an example of someone who doesn't stick wholly to one approach:

- Lewis's Apologetic Approach- Mix of Evidentialism and Presuppositionalism?
- Explanation of presuppositional vs evidentialism- Demolition Derby vs leading someone to something unfamiliar. Presuppose Bible and show Impossibility of contrary. But there is room for evidences.

(Written August 2013?)

Some notes on "No Argument for God" by John Wilkinson

I'm halfway through this. 

This book is written in a warm, conversational tone and it covers some important topics for Christians to think about. However, Wilkinson makes some serious errors in thinking, and those errors would be quite damaging to the Christian church if more people took some of the things he says on board. (Although I won’t go into that side of things here, I’ll merely discuss his ideas).  

Wilkinson writes about the limits of reason, and how reason and the senses on their own create a flat world, devoid of any clarity about ideas of meaning and purpose. Meaning and purpose cannot be empirically proven. He uses this discussion as a springboard to talk about the third dimension, ie: revelation.

However I’m not convinced that things are as simple as Wilkinson makes out. Why does “reason” have to only involve the “senses”? On the contrary, reasoning about something is simply thinking about something. We can reason about things that go beyond the mere senses, and in fact there are entire disciplines of philosophy that do just that. Wilkinson himself is offering us “reasons” of sorts to accept Christian revelation in this book, but one assumes he doesn’t think his own “reasoning” falls prey to his own critiques of reason? Perhaps the discussion would’ve been clearer if Wilkinson had referred to the hard sciences here instead. But of course, he wouldn’t do that because he’d be unable to make the same critique of the limits of the entire concept of “reason” without referring to it as reason. It'd be much more obvious to any reader that his discussion needs to get broader if he did that. I agree with much of what he has to say about the limits of science, but science and reason are not coterminous. This is not mere semantics. 

So after critiquing reason, Wilkinson moves onto revelation. He believes we need the third dimension of revelation to give us meaning and purpose which can’t be attained from the two dimensional world of “reason” alone. Revelation gives us the “why” of life whereas “reason” gives us the “how” of life. (And again, perhaps Wilkinson should have said science, which would have been more accurate). But Wilkinson commits a familiar error here. He introduces a very crucial topic but doesn’t adequately define it. He merely says that “Revelation” is the disclosure of a person and that it answers the why questions.

This quote disappointed me: 

“When someone reveals something, he or she draws back the curtain on it’s purpose. Someone explains why the object is there. The problem with revelation is that there is no proof; we have to accept the person’s word”. (p56).

The Christian message is the message of God becoming flesh. Jesus walked among us. The central Christian claim is that of the resurrection. As the Apostle Paul wrote, without it our faith would well and truly be in vain. The Resurrection was, historically, the beginning of Christianity. It is the cornerstone of Christianity and, further than that, it is therefore the KEY to Christian revelation itself. It was an event that took place in history. It was God’s son literally interacting with the senses of the people who witnessed it.

This is why as a fellow Christian, reading the quote about “Revelation” above was deeply troubling. There is an obvious, serious, concerning problem with Wilkinson’s thesis: It simply does not make sense of the Christian message. Wilkinson is a Christian pastor, but he is wheeling out grand statements about abstract ideas like “revelation” that do not make sense of the Christian teaching itself! Christian revelation is not SIMPLY revealing the “why” of life, and “drawing back the curtain” on the purpose of the universe. Christian revelation is not an ethereal philosophy of life or a list of moral teachings. The key event informing Christian revelation is an event that happened in place and time. Now, the resurrection cannot be “proven” 100% one way or the other. But it can be investigated by the tools of history. It is not something that is completely sheltered from “reasoning” one way or the other as Wilkinson would so clearly and evidently like it to be.

Part way through the book, after Wilkinson’s threads start coming together in major arguments about reason and revelation as I’ve (fairly, hopefully) stated above, something dawned on me that hadn’t hit me earlier. Ironically, Wilkinson is actually doing the opposite of what he wants to achieve with this book.  Wilkinson thinks we are at risk of “robbing Christianity of it’s distinctive flavor” (p35). We’re trying to make it friendlier by robbing it of difficulties. We want to be able to tell people “it fits entirely in your brain!”(p35). But ironically, it is Wilkinson who is trying to fit God into a box. According to Wilkinson, “Christianity does not conform to human logic” (p24). Wilkinson recounts his own faith story, in which he prayed to God “I choose to believe in you, even though I have no reason to”. (p20).  But surely he must realize that this is not everyone’s experience? There are many Christians who have, in fact, come to faith through or partly through reason and arguments. C.S. Lewis was an Oxford Professor in his 30’s when he became a Christian, and he ended up as possibly the most widely read Christian author of the 20^th century. Mortimer J Adler was one of the greatest philosophers of the 20^th century, and he became a Christian in his 80’s.  

Stories like these (and countless others) should teach us that God is BIGGER than we think. God can use experiences like Wilkinson’s to reach people, but he can also use reason, science and arguments to reach people as well. Wilkinson is trying to fit faith into the “absurd” box, whilst telling us how much he despises those who try to fit faith into the “logic” box. God doesn’t fit into Wilkinson’s box anymore than he fits into anyone else’s. The truth is that everyone’s experience of God is different to other people’s, and that is perfectly OK.

Christianity doesn’t confirm entirely to human logic at all points. Wilkinson is right about that. But that’s largely because God is an infinite God and we are finite beings. How could small, rationally limited people like us fully understand and explain an infinite being? If there is an infinite God, it wouldn’t make sense for us to be able to “fully grasp” him/it. On the contrary, you’d have to ask yourself whether anyone who thinks they know it all about this God is in fact kidding themselves. Wilkinson would agree with that much as well.

We see like we’re seeing through glass dimly. Dimly indeed. But that doesn’t mean Christianity is, on the whole, “contrary to reason” or that there are “no reasons” to believe! 

Should Christians Engage in Natural Theology?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm2H5dQ84Oc


C Stephen Evans

Hayward Lectures 2012, Acadia Divinity College, Acadia University Nova Scotia.

Lecture 1:

Should Christians engage in Natural Theology?

 And if so, how do we go about it?

God has always called some to defend him: Ancient World. Atheists (rejection of local Gods), superstitious- Miracles, subverters due to social stances. Justin Martyr.

1 Peter 3:15- Give reason- faith is reasonable.

New Atheists: Four Horsemen- Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennett and Harris.

• -          Distinguishing Factor: Religion is not just wrong but it is dangerous.
• -          None of them have much experience, knowledge or awareness of philosophy of religion.
• -          Some atheists are embarrassed by them.

Dawkins has a novel argument: Designer must be more complex.

• -          But: Divine simplicity.
• -          There is no real reason to believe this premise.

Brash confidence:

• -          They want to write best sellers.
• -          Religion is not just wrong but Ethically and socially harmful.
• -          Questioning the idea of religious tolerance.
• -          Reversal of previous thoughts. Previously, people thought LACK of religious belief was so bad that we should be wary of it. Could be harmful. Now, have we gone full circle?
• -          Baptists stood up for religious freedom in this environment.

So, how should we respond?

• -          Theologians and Biblical Scholars should point out the flows in how they read the Bible in wooden ways.
• -          Plantinga, John Polkinghorne, Collins etc (Recommended) have shown the science and religion are compatible.
• -          Christian doctrine of sin shows that ethical failures of Christians shouldn’t be surprising.
• -          But New Atheist analysis of ethical actions of Christians is one sided. They exaggerate wrongs but don’t give credit where it is due.
• -          Justice, rights and wrongs: Wolsterstorff. Doctrine of human rights stems from Biblical faith and nowadays there is no adequetae replacement for Biblical vision.
• -          Jeffrey Burton Russell: Clearing the air, exposing the myths about Christianity.
• -          Stark: The Victory of Reason. May go too far in answering. Starks analysis may be unbalanced towards the other side! But, makes a convincing historical case- science etc stem from faith, not from some secular ideas. 
• -          Good to point out their weaknesses in social analysis/ethics etc. However, at a basic intellectual level we must show why a reasonable person can believe in Christianity. Failure to clearly articulate this simply plays into the New Atheists’s hands. 
• -          First sin of religious believers in their eyes is not to follow reason.
• -          A central idea of Christianity (and some other faiths) is: God exists.
• -          Response from Christians has been Natural Theology. Eg: Mere Christianity.
• -          Philosophers have done Natural Theology. However, it is not prominent in theology. Some view it with suspicion.
• -          This has given NA’s some ground. They see religious belief as Zero grounds, all faith which means no evidence. Eg: Dawkins at Cambridge.
• -          “Defined themselves into epistemological safe ground”. No public voice makes it appear that no serious case can be made. “What can be asserted without proof can be dismissed without proof” (Hitchens).
• -          NA’s are evidentialist in their epistemology.

How to respond?

• -          Attack their epistemology. Eg: Reformed epistemology. Sensus divinitas NOT belief by evidence. That kind of belief in God can be ”Properly basic”. It is a foundational belief. No argument or evidence? That’s ok.
• -          I am sympathetic towards it .Plantinga/Wolsterstorff. It’s simple contentions are correct. But, it shouldn’t be our whole response. To argue that religious belief can be grounded without arguments or evidence is not the same as arguing that there are no good arguments or evidence.
• -          There is both propositional and non propositional evidence.
• -          Views of RE’s can be re stated.
• -          However in simple terms it looks like confirmation of NA claims. Ie: There is no evidence (if we say “religious belief can be grounded without).
• -          2 stage apologetics- One: Reasons why faith in God can be rational THEN two- reasons why revelation rational.
• -          Why NT not prominent amongst protestant theologians?
• -          Perhaps enlightenment views have debilitated NT.
• -          Other reasons: Widespread suspicion that it undermines centrality of revalation.
• -          But NT is revelation too. But, “Special” revelation from General revelation. Karl Barth. I am sympathetic to some of his reasons against NT.
• -          “Transcendence” and above us. We will end up creating God in our own image.
• -          Paul Moser has criticised. NT leads to thin theism. Abstract metaphysical claims. IF there’s a God, he isn’t interested in us knowing propositions, rather he is personal and wants us to know him. Spectator Evidence doesn’t cut the mustard of personal transformation.
• -          (TDE Note: Craig response to evil borrows heavily from this).
• -          We submit to God’s terms not vice versa.

Anti Naturalism

• -          We can accet all of these claims and STILL see value in NT response to New Atheism.
• -          Value can be in “Anti naturalism”.
• -          Imagine not religious believer, what shou;d they think? Is the most reasonable view of our universe, naturalism? “Nature is all there is”? Should reasonabke non believers be atheists? No. There are problems with naturalism. There are difficulties. We reconceive NT as a defense of anti naturalism. Point to aspects of our natural world that point beyond nature. Natural Signs. Points towards a profound mystery. NT articulates questions that a reasonable person ought to ask. Even if N theologians cant adequetyl answer them, NT will point us in the direction of being open to the kinds of Answers that Barth and Moser would like.
• -          I deny that naturalism is the most reasonable view of reality that one can take, even if they aren’t a believer.
• -          Epistemic situation of someone who is confronting the reasonableness of naturalism vs rivals.
• -          Where does burden of proof lie? What kind of evidence would we expect there to be if God exists and wants a relationship with us?

Burden of Proof

• -          Flew’s the presumption of atheism.
• -          They think of God as if he were one more thing in the universe. Eg “We all agree the universe contains dogs, cats, quarks, black holes”. Theist goes beyond this basic common ground. Like believing in the Loch Ness monster.
• -          If this were the case YES believer would have a burden.
• -          It’s about does the universe have a certain character or not? Is there a sustaining power behind it all?
• -          Is there a purpose? Or does everything exist on it’s own? Is the universe one big brute fact among many brute facts??
• -          Theist and naturalist don’t just disagree about God, they disagree about everything.
• -          Atheist mistake: Confuse commitment to naturalism (metaphysical) with commitment to science. But, theists and atheists don’t disagree about scientific facts and data!
• -          Question of naturalism: Is nature all there is?
• -          Science investigates the natural world, but it is not fit to investigate whether there is more than the natural world.
• -          Theist holds that scientific laws hold because of God’s creative activity. Atheist has no explanation. But, ultimately the question of whether there is more is a philosophical question. Like most philosophical question,s this can’t be strictly proven either way. If by prove we mean an argument that no reasonable person could doubt.
• -          God’s existence cnnot be proven. But neither can naturalism. Proof in this sense is an ideal.
• -          What is reasonable is asking which rival worldview makes the most sense?

Evidence

• -          What kind of evidence should we expect to find, if God did exist.
• -          If God is a hypothesis, we should ask what consequences would follow if that hypothesis was true.
• -          Some kind of knowledge would be available and widely available. It would be bizarre if you had to have a phd in philosophy or understand quantum physics to have a knowledge of God. We’d expect it to be fairly pervasive and easy to find.
• -          Christianty theology assumes a certain kind of r’ship: Freely, motivated by God’s goodness not coercion or fear. If God’s existence was too obvious, that would not make sense of this. It would have to be dismissable. Ambigious. Able to be explained away. Easily resistible.
• -          Pascal Pensees quote. Signs seen by those who seek but not by those who deny.
• -          WAP and ERP. Two Pascallian constraints on evidence for God’s existence.

To do NT, we must have three things right:

• 1.       Anti naturalism, rather than positive, complete knowledge of God. It’s goal is to tell us that there’s something beyond the natural world.
• 2.       Burden or proof must be right. No presumption of atheism. All rival worldviews are accountable to reason.
• 3.       Right view of the kind of evidence that it is reasonable to seek.
•  

Questions

Constantly changing evidence. Don’t wanna hitch our wagon to the latest scientific evidence. Eg: If we had to wait until modern physics was finalised to know whether there was a God. Eg: Fine Tuning argument which is based on relatively recent science. There may be value a nd something in these arguments but ultimately We would expect universal aspects of human experience. WAP principle. BUT Can still be “defeater” against WAP. So defeaters must be considered. Defeaters of signs must be considered. My view is that the signs are neither supported by nor threatened by scientific evidence.

NA a fad? Probably not. It has a cultural influence and impact. It’s stretched far. Atheists joining together.

Affecting families? Yes. Need to show not just intellectual but understand the attraction of their writing etc. Stuents with fundamentalist readings or no knowledge or bible can be easy pickings.

Calvinism- no need for apologetics? Do the Pascallian constraints lend themselves to this kind of thinking?

Evidence doesn’t have to be propositional. Signs can have an immediate impact. Sign becomes focus of reflection and we articulate them. That’s where the arguments come from. Don’t impact everybody but always retain appeal.

Common Sense Realism George Marsden. Are you opening yourself up to the dangers that this kind of thinking opened itself up to.

God and Evidence

The question of God's existence is alive and well in contemporary culture, and for this we must heap much praise on the likes of Richard Dawkins. He came along and wrote a little book called The God Delusion which has been a best seller for the past 5 years. Whilst I'm fairly young, the impression I get is that the issue has finally escaped from the halls of University Campuses and found it's way into mainstream newspapers and even onto public buses in various locations around the world!

The question is usually framed in the context of how much evidence there is for God's existence. We see the proponents weighing the reasons there are for thinking that God exists against the reasons for thinking that God is the greatest delusion in the history of humankind. And that's all good and well, away we go to happily assess the weight of evidence, right? Wrong. Before we even consider what evidence there is that God exists, we should ask the question of what evidence we should expect to see in the case that God did exist. This is the first and most foundational question in the whole discussion. Absence of evidence A for thing X is only evidence of X's absence if we should expect to see evidence A in the case that X did exist. Yet unfortunatly, this is rarely discussed. People generally argue that there's plenty of evidence for God, that there's enough evidence for God, or that there's no evidence, or some other position on the continuum.

The issue is more complicated than I've said here. For example, what type of evidence we should expect to see is a kind of subset of the initial question. And another question, which is even more foundational, is What is evidence anyway? However the principle is clear enough that it can help hugely without needing to complicate matters with these other questions. If people simply asked this question before talking about what evidence there is for God, it would solve a whole lot of problems and make the discussion much clearer.




[November 2011]

The Biggest Bubble?

David Marshall made an interesting comment in the latest Apologetics 315 interview:

"I'm not a real big fan of inerrancy, because it's kind of like blowing up a big balloon and then asking the opponent to pop the Bubble, pop the balloon with a pin. Even if the Bible is without error, I wouldn't be a fan of the doctrine because I think it's bad strategy. The materialist, skeptics and atheists, they've blown up the biggest balloon of all and that balloon is materialism. They're saying that not one single miracle has ever happened in the history of the universe. Well I'm sorry but they do happen. And that's another contribution of missions. Working as a missionary in Asia, I found that God did sometimes answer prayer, sometimes the answers changed lives in amazing ways. Now of course there's all kinds of difficulties about proving that, and we can't use the scientific method to test a historical claim, but it's much more fun to make a positive argument for something than to defend against somebody else's attack".

There's two interesting comments here that are worth expanding on so I've highlighted them. One is the nature of historical events. By definition, Historical events happen once. And by definition, Science looks for repeatable patterns. So by mere definition, we can't expect historical events to meet the standards of scientific evidence. Does this mean that we can never have reliable evidence for Historical events? No, clearly not. Not unless you believe documents, writings, archaological findings, eye witness reports and all manner of historical data are all conceptually incapable of providing evidence for something.

The more interesting comment is the first bolded part where Marshall refers to Materialism as "The Biggest Bubble". Marshall is referring to what I call The Problem of Total Denial. To me, this is the single biggest problem for materialism and for naturalism. The problem is this: If they're consistent, Materialists and Naturalists must deny the many reported events and occurences in the world which do not fit into their paradigm. They must take many reports and then either deny that the event happened as it was described, or find a naturalistic explanation for it. I will write about this more in the future as I really want to develop my thinking on the issue. In the books I've read on Philosophy, Apologetics, the Historicity of Jesus etc, this is an issue that doesn't receive nearly enough coverage. It is truly underrated. I'm glad Marshall reminded me of it!

Natural explanation of religious belief

RJS discusses Natural explanations of religious belief over at Jesus Creed.

This is an interesting topic, and the best discussion I've seen, to date, was by C Stephen Evans in his brilliant book Natural Signs and Knowledge of God.

One alternative angle that Justin Barrett brings to bear on this topic was discussed by RJS:

Theologians offer intellectual ways to reconcile doctrines such as free will and predestination, grace and merit but people will automatically fall into more “natural” ways of thinking. This is true even of many of those theologians when caught off guard. Such natural response can be studied by telling stories with gaps and recording how people fill in the gaps reflexively in real time.

The gap between these two conceptions is theological correctness. Like political correctness, when our intellectual guard is up, we use the ideas we know we are supposed to use; different ideas than those that come naturally. The further ideas deviate from Natural Religion, the harder they are to use reflexively in real-time situations. (p. 326)

RJS made a comment in response to Scot McKnight which was good:

It is fairly common for people to point out that belief is a “natural” phenomenon and to construct ways in which this tendency evolved – and then to assign religious belief as a (fictional) tag-along. My main point it that this conclusion is based on an assumption about the nature of reality. It is not an objective conclusion from the data.

If God is real, and if he created via evolutionary means, we would also expect a “natural” belief for the kind of reason I give in the post.

I would not argue that the naturalness of religion is evidence for the truth of religious belief, but neither is it an argument against the truth of religious belief. A little critical thinking will show that a metaphysical view shapes the choice of conclusion here.

(Boldings mine).
This is an example of how our philosophical presuppositions provide the foundation for how we interpret data. It is imperative to examine not only our own views, but our own presuppositions underlying those very views. In other words, always keeping one eye on the big picture.

Reason for Faith Festival Q n A Interaction: Resurrection

Tonight I attended a screening of the film Test of Faith, followed by a panel discussion. The event was part of the Reason for Faith festival, a response to the Global Atheist Convention backed by various Christian groups.

After the panel discussion, the audience had an opportunity to ask a question of the panellists. I asked a question which ended up being the most discussed question of the night! My question was responded to, and then I was asked to clarify, then it was discussed again, and finally Jack Scanlan responded to my question again in his closing remarks.

I listen to debates and panel discussions like this regularly, and it is easy to critique the views being expressed from the comfort of my computer, but it is more difficult with a microphone in a room full of people! I keenly await the recording to find out how articulate I was and whether it came out nearly as well as I wanted it to.

My question was asking for Scanlan's thoughts on looking at evidence through a broader lens, and specifically his thoughts on looking at the Resurrection argument accurately, as a Christian might understand it. That was what I was trying to get across. Scanlan is a molecular biology student, and was talking about the Resurrection. He cast the debate as a question of the reliability of historical documents vs the findings of science. His view, if I accurately heard it, was that biology has proven that people do not rise from the dead, and so you would need an unreasonable faith in historical documents to overcome this. On face value this view might appear compelling, but it misses the essence of the Christian claim. What biology tells us is that people don't rise from the dead via natural causes. But here's the issue: Christians aren't making the claim that Jesus was raised from the dead via natural causes. Christians claim that Jesus was raised from the dead by God. So I asked for his thoughts on this.

At first Scanlan fumbled through a response and concluded by saying that he would hope all evidence could be examined neutrally, without having our response impacted by prior beliefs. But this is clearly problematic, primarily because the world just doesn't work like that! Ideas do not exist in a vacuum. If you hear that someone you know has been arrested for a theft, you would be completely surprised....if said person was a well adjusted member of society. If, on the other hand, this person had a violent upbringing, an abusive father, and had a prior record of theft, then you wouldn't be very surprised at hearing about another crime, would you? So the point is this. Background evidence counts. As I wrote about previously, if God exists then miracles are possible. But if, like Graham Oppy, you believe that natural causes are all that exist, then miracles like a resurrection are inconceivably unlikely to you. So it's not as simple as looking at historical evidence on it's own. If you're determining the probability of what happened, you need to look at the big picture and cast your net a little wider. Or at the very least, you need to acknowledge the existence of your own presuppositions and their bearing on your response to the evidence. Scanlan had shown no respect or awareness of this vital issue, hence my question to him.

After clarifying my question (how effectively I'm not sure!) Dr Bruce Yabsley commented about the uniformity of nature. Modern science, going back to Newton, shows that nature is uniform, he said. This puts the sting in the tail of the argument that Resurrections simply do not happen. And this is a fair point. But unfortunatly Dr Yabsley didn't follow up those comments by acknowledging that the resurrection cannot be expected to conform to those regular patterns. If a resurrection did happen, then it happened once and at the command of a God who controls the universe and all the physical laws within it. It is not an event that we should expect would be repeated. The test tubes and telescopes may tell us that in every case ever recorded, Science shows that X, Y or Z happens this way or that way. That's all good and well. But if there is a lawgiver behind those laws then there is no reason why things cannot happen differently on one occasion. So again, the prior philosophical question of whether there is a God will have a direct bearing on how we interpret the historical evidence and the interaction of science with that historical evidence.

In his closing comment, Scanlan said that if there was good evidence for the Resurrection, he'd more easily believe that aliens did it than God. In one sense this response merely supported my argument about the need to understand your own presuppositions! Aliens, if they exist, are presumably natural entities rather than immaterial, supernatural beings, and, if you believe that life on other planets is probable (as Scanlan may or may not), then you might be inclined to believe this. For me, this idea is discounted by the fact that Jesus didn't ever mention "aliens". There is a historical context in which Jesus lived and into which he spoke, such that if there was good evidence, you would need to interpret the good evidence within that context. In short, there is historical evidence that Jesus was a Jew who claimed divinity as the Messiah appointed by God. Thus, if there was good evidence for a resurrection, you'd consider that God might have done it, rather than posulate an entity who has no prior connection with the context or the historical evidence whatsoever.

Lewis's Trilemma

C.S Lewis's Trilemma is probably the most famous argument in Christian apologetics.

The argument is thus:

"I am trying here to prevent anyone saying the really foolish thing that people often say about Him: I’m ready to accept Jesus as a great moral teacher, but I don’t accept his claim to be God. That is the one thing we must not say. A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher. He would either be a lunatic — on the level with the man who says he is a poached egg — or else he would be the Devil of Hell. You must make your choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God, or else a madman or something worse. You can shut him up for a fool, you can spit at him and kill him as a demon or you can fall at his feet and call him Lord and God, but let us not come with any patronising nonsense about his being a great human teacher. He has not left that open to us. He did not intend to. ... Now it seems to me obvious that He was neither a lunatic nor a fiend: and consequently, however strange or terrifying or unlikely it may seem, I have to accept the view that He was and is God."^[5]

The logic appears sound. It is hard to imagine someone going around claiming to be the Son of God, whilst just being a regular human male, unless they were either 1. totally deluded and suffering from seriously bad mental illness or 2. A complete liar.

But as with most arguments, the value of the argument depends on who it is addressed to and the underlying assumptions that are brought to the table.

The "trilemma" on it's own can only be addressed to people who already accept all of Jesus's teachings as being historical words that the historical Jesus actually spoke. In other words, the argument doesn't address the possibility that Jesus did exist but that he didnt say everything that was attributed to him OR that he didn't exist at all. Before you can use it, you need to either 1. assume or prove that Jesus made his various claims of divinity , or 2. you need to know that your audience already accepts this. Having said that, there are good historical reasons to suggest that Jesus did make claims to divinity- therefore once you've done that groundwork, then the argument may be put to use and could be effective to some degree, to a wider range of people than those who Lewis was originally addressing.

 

Lewis claims that people "often" say that Jesus was just a teacher, but his argument still isn't wholly effective even to that target audience. Many people in that category would have the objection that they simply can't accept any supernatural stuff- and that is why they stick to the moral teachings. I think that kind of objection requires philosophical arguments against naturalism per se, in addition to a historical argument such as the Trilemma. For someone who has a strong naturalist outlook that they bring to bear on the Jesus question, and who believes they have good independent reasons for believing naturalism, it is difficult to imagine them being convinced of Jesus's divinity merely by the Trilemma, even if they already accept the historicity of Jesus's claims to divinity. However in this instance, the Trilemma could form a part of an overall argument or set of arguments.

 

With the above qualifications in place, we can see that the Trilemma can have some value in showing that Christianity is reasonable.

Summary of Natural Theology

Below I have reproduced a taxonomy of theistic arguments from the blog Appeared to Blogly, formerly doxazo theos.com. I have copied the site in full, and take no credit or responsibility for the contents. The formatting is better over at the actual site, so I really should just link to it, but I thought it was such a good summary that I wanted it on my own blog!

Many of the sources are available online via hyperlink, but I wasn't able to copy those across without much time and effort. So please visit the site if you're interested in reading more, because there's many good resources linked to.


Appeared-to-Blogly

Theistic Arguments

This page is a continual work in progress.

This will be an outline of a class on the project of natural theology, emphasis on evidence for Christian theism. The purpose is twofold: (1) Provide an taxonomic overview of some of the most important topics and arguments related to the project of natural theology. (2) Provide a resource guide (references in print and/or on the internet) in the form of numbered endnotes. The resource guide will by no means be exhaustive, but rather will reflect what I perceive to be the most influential or important contemporary written work on each topic or argument. Many of the referenced work have critical replies, rejoinders and surrejoinders. It is beyond the scope of this page to cite them all.

I hope this outline will be particularly useful to those interested in putting together lesson material on the subject, but also hope it to be a useful guide for personal research in general. I will periodically update the outline and resources as new pertinent issues and arguments become available. Questions about the outline? Feel free to E-mail me at mcintosh_chad@hotmail.com

*I would greatly appreciate being notified of any broken or dead hyperlinks!

Evidence for Christian Theism

I. The Nature of Evidence

1. The Nature of Proof

A. Cartesian Certainty

a. The question of whether God’s existence can be proved with certainty uninteresting

i. Nothing meets the standard of Cartesian certainty


B. Justification and Rationality1

a. The more interesting question is whether belief in God can be rational or justified

i. What does it mean for a belief to be rational or justified?

ii. A belief can be either externally justified (arguments) or self-justified (basic beliefs)


2. Religious Epistemology2

A. Belief in God sans Evidence3

a. Belief in God may be a properly basic (self-justified) belief4

b. Natural theology and religious epistemology are best thought of as separate but consistent projects


i. Natural theology focuses on external, evidential justification

3. Good Arguments


A. Varieties of Arguments

a. Deductive


b. Inductive or Probabilistic

c. Abductive


B. Criteria for Good Arguments5

a. Deductively valid or inductively strong

b. Premises more plausible, more probable, or stronger than their respective negations

4. Making a Case for Theism6

A. Restricted Cases (Single Argument)

a. Strengths of offering restricted cases

i. Allows for a much more elaborate and sophisticated defense

b. Weaknesses of offering restricted cases

i. The force of an entire restricted case usually depends on the plausibility of just one or a couple of the argument’s premises

ii. If sound, conclusions are more narrow

B. Cumulative Cases (Multiple Arguments)7

a. Strengths of offering cumulative cases

i. Combines the strengths of multiple, perhaps more modest arguments into one powerful case (internally reinforced)

ii. Allows a much wider and informative conclusion to be inferred

b. Weaknesses of offering cumulative cases

i. Individual arguments remain merely sketched and undeveloped

C. God as Best Explanation8

a. Criteria for best explanation or hypothesis9

i. Fecundity (relevance and fruitfulness)

ii. Simplicity

iii. Explanatory scope

iv. Explanatory power

v. Plausibility

vi. Degree of ad hoc-ness

vii. Fits well into background knowledge

viii.

Exceeds rival explanations in fulfilling conditions (2)-(7)

b.
Bayes’ Theorem [Pr(HE) = Pr(EH) x Pr(H) / Pr(E)]10

II.

A Taxonomy of Theistic Arguments

1. Cosmological Arguments11

*
Definition: A family of arguments that postulate God’s existence as the ultimate cause, ground, or explanation of the universe or cosmos
A. Three Main Types

a. Kalam12
i. Demonstrates the need for a first cause based on the finitude of the past

b. Thomistic13
i. Demonstrates the need for a first cause in terms of rank or kind (necessary, contingent), not necessarily temporality

c. Leibnizian14

i. Demonstrates that God is the only sufficient reason or explanation for either some part or the whole of existence

ii. Relies on the validity and applications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)15

B. Contemporary Versions
a. A modal cosmological argument16

b. An inductive cosmological argument17

2. Design Arguments18

*
Definition: Argues there are features of the universe or things within the universe that are best explained by design, or the causal activity of intelligence

A. Variety of Design Phenomena19

a. Design as order and nomology,20 simplicity, complexity, beauty, purpose and cognition,21 information,22 cosmic constants, et al.


b. It is argued design can be detected in almost any hard science (E.g., chemistry and biology,23 cosmology and physics24)

B. Detecting Design25
a. An inference to design is justified when the explanandum is

i. imporbable or unlikely, and

ii. conforms to an independently discernable pattern

3. Axiological Arguments26

*Definition: Argues that the only adequate ground or explanation for the nature of value and morality is God

A. Morality27

a. The justification of belief in moral facts28
i. Including the objective moral facts of evil and suffering29

b. The connection between morality and theism30

c. Problems with non-theistic accounts of morality

i. Naturalistic accounts31

ii. Non-theistic accounts of moral realism32

iii. Moral relativism33

B. The Nature of Value and Persons34
C. Moral Normativity35
a. Our sense of moral obligation, accountability, responsibility, punishment, praise, blame, etc.

D. Altruism and Supererogation36

4. Ontological Arguments37

* Definition: Argues a priori that the very concept of God entails his existence

A. Classical Versions
a. Anselmian38
b. Other39

B. Contemporary Treatments40
a. Plantinga41
b. Maydole42
c. Gödel43

5. Noölogical and Epistemological Arguments

* Definition: Argues that certain mental phenomena (I.e., the mind, knowledge) is best explained by the existence of God

A. The Incompatibility of Naturalism and Knowledge44
B. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism45
C. The Argument from Reason46
D. The Argument from Proper Function47
E. The Argument from Consciousness48
F. Arguments for Dualism & Life After Death49
a. A priori arguments50
b. A posteriori arguments51
i. Scientific (e.g., empirical, neuro-based arguments)52
ii. Testimonial (e.g., NDEs, OBEs, historical, etc.)53

G. The Incompatibility of Naturalist-Epistemology and Realisms54
H. The Argument from Truth-Antirealism55

6. Conceptualist and Nomological Arguments
* Definition: Argues that God is the ground or explanation of metaphysically necessary entities such as abstracta (numbers, propositions, properties, etc.) and laws (natural or logical).

A. The Conceptualist Argument56
B. The Incompatibility of Naturalism and Abstracta57
C. The Laws of Nature58
D. The Transcendental Argument59

7.

Religious Experience60
* Definition: Attempts to show that religious experiences either require a religious explanation or justify religious beliefs

A. Kinds of Religious Experience

a. E.g., Feeling-based, perceptual, interpretive, mystical, etc.

B. God as Casual Explanation of Religious Experiences

C. The Veridicality of Religious Experiences

a. The Principle of Credulity (Swinburne)

b. Direct-Perception

i. Sense perception (Alston)

ii. Other kinds of perception (e.g., numinous)


8. Pragmatic Arguments61

* Definition: Seeks to justify religious beliefs on practical, prudential, and/or existential grounds

A. Pascal’s Wager62

B. Other Wager Arguments

a.

E.g., The Jamesian Wager, J. S. Mill’s wager63

b. Kierkegaardian Rationality64

C. The Presumption of Theism

a. Argues that God and immortality is the only adequate source of objective meaning, purpose, and/or value65

b. If we are justified in believing in objective meaning, purpose, and/or value, we are justified in believing that God exists

9. Miscellaneous Arguments

A. The Argument from Language66

B. The Argument from Beauty & Aesthetics67

C. The Argument from Desire68

D. The Anthropological Argument69

E. The Ontomystical Argument70

F. Teleology and Free Will71

10. Historical Arguments

* Definition: Argues that the historicity of certain events or documents is as evidential support for Christianity and/or the existence of God

A. The Historical Reliability of the Bible

a. Old Testament72

b. New Testament73

i. The Historical Reliability of the Gospels74


B. The Historical Jesus75

a. Jesus’s Claims to Divinity76

b. Jesus in Extrabiblical Literature77

C. The Historicity of the Resurrection78

D. Miracles79

E. Fulfilled Prophecy80


Endnotes

1.

Two excellent resources on general epistemology is Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000); Michael Huemer (ed.) with introduction by Robert Audi, Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002). Particularly good books on the subject are Alvin Plantinga’s volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford, 1993), Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford, 1993) and Paul Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge, 1991).

2.

A very thorough guide on the literature here (up to 1999) is Michael Sudduth’s “Reformed Epistemology Bibliography.” Outstanding books are include Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell, 1967), Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith & Rationality: Reason & Belief in God (Notre Dame, 1984), in which is Plantinga’s chapter “Reason and Belief in God.” Plantinga, Warranted Christian belief (Oxford, 2000). Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology (Oxford, 1992). For a tidy outline of the project of religious epistemology, see William Lane Craig’s chapter “Religious Epistemology” in his and Moreland’s book, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP, 2003), pp. 154-170. For a somewhat different approach to religious epistemology, see Paul Moser, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (Cambridge, 2008).

3.

Kelly James Clark’s “Without Evidence or Argument” is an excellent article-sized treatment of religious epistemology.

4.

The standard paper here is Plantinga’s “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” Nous 15 (1981), pp. 41-51.

5.

Brief but good discussions on the criteria of good arguments can be found in William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Crossway, ed. 2008), pp. 51-56; “Arguing Successfully About God: A Review Essay of Graham Oppy’s Arguing about Gods,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008), pp. 435-442. Alvin Plantinga’s new preface to his “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” in Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 203-209. Stephen T. Davis, “What Good Are Theistic Proofs?,” in Louis Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Wadsworth, 1987). A more thorough treatment is Davis’s in God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs (Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 1-12, 176-190. One of the best discussions is found in George Mavrodes small but wonderful book, Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion (Random House, 1970), 3-48. The most thorough treatment of condition b. in the outline is James Freeman, Acceptable Premises: A Epistemic Approach to An Informal Logic Problem (Cambridge, 2005). Freeman argues that a good argument is one whose basic premises have a presumption.

6.

The various approaches to making a case for theism can be found in Steve Cowan (ed.), Five Views on Apologetics (Zondervan, 2000), which features a very able representative of each.
7.

A cumulative case exemplar is Alvin Plantinga’s “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments.”

8.

Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (Routledge, 2009). Kelly James Clark, “The Explanatory Power of Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 25 (1989), pp. 129-146. Clark’s paper is a nice overview of how Bayes’s theorem has been used in natural theology. R. Douglas Geivett, “Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism,” ch. 3 in Stan Wallace (ed), Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate (Ashgate, 2003). Wilko van Holten’s “Theism and Inference to the Best Explanation” Ars Disputandi 2 (2002) is excellent, especially for its bibliographical strength.

9.

Par for the course is Peter Lipton’s Inference to the Best Explanation (Routledge, ed. 2004). See also Paul Thagard, “The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice” The Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978), pp. 67-92. Gilbert H. Harman, “Inference to the Best Explanation” The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), pp. 88–95. On the nature, justification, and criteria for best explanation, chs 1-4 of Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God (Oxford, ed. 2004) has been influential.The story is a little different for historical explanations. To begin with, there is a difference in justifying a document’s historicity and justifying some historical explanation or hypothesis. The former usually makes reference to so-called “criteria of authenticity.” There have been volumes written on such criteria, but a good overview is Robert H. Stein’s “The ‘Criteria’ for Authenticity,” in R. T. France & David Wenham (eds.), Gospel Perspectives Vol. 1: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels (JSOT, 1980), pp. 225-263. On the latter, much discussion seems to be owed to C. Behan McCullagh’s Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge, 1984).

10.

Bayes’s theorem has broader applications, but for much of its philosophical underpinnings, see Swinburne (ed.), Bayes’s Theorem (Oxford, 2005). Almost all of Swinburne’s writings, including both his restricted and cumulative cases for theism, utilize Bayes’s theorem. See also Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (Routledge, ed. 2004), pp. 103-120. See also James Joyce, “Bayes’ Theorem,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Brandon Fitelson, Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory (University of Wisconson dissertation, 2001).

11.

For an overview of some recent issues and literature relevant to the cosmological argument, see David Beck, “The Cosmological Argument: A Current Bibliographical Appraisal” Philosophia Christi 2 (2002), pp. 283–304. Bruce Reichenbach, “Cosmological Argument,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Alexander Pruss, “Some Recent Progress on the Cosmological Argument” (Presented at the Two Tasks Conference, 2006). For a historical exposition, see William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz (Wipf & Stock, 2001).

12.

See William Lane Craig’s numerous writings. Major defenses are Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Wipf & Stock, ed. 2000); Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford, 1995). Mark Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God (Prometheus, 2007). A very up-to-date defense is Craig & James Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in Craig & Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 101-201. “A concise, article-sized treatment is Craig, “The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe” Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991), pp 85-96. For a good article-sized defense not by Craig, see James Beebe, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God.”

13.

This argument fell on hard times but is recently making a strong comeback. See Timothy O’Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Ultimate Shape of Contingency (Blackwell, 2008). O’connor’s argument is a sort of blend of the Thomistic and Leibnizian cosmological arguments. But because the structure is largely Thomistic and the conclusion is buttressed by Leibnizian considerations, I classify his argument as Thomistic. See his “And This All Men Call God” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 417-435. William F. Vallicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (Kluwer, 2002). Robert Koons, “A New Look at the Cosmological Argument” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1996), pp. 193-212; “Defeasible Reasoning, Special Pleading and the Cosmological Argument” (2000). Koons identifies his arguments as in line with Thomistic tradition, though they have a distinctly modal tint (as does O’Connor’s).For an explicitly modal spin on the Thomistic cosmological argument, see Robert Maydole, “The Modal Third Way” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), pp. 1-28. For an unpublished version of this paper, see his “Aquinas’ Third Way Modalized.” Peter van Inwagen, “Necessary Being: The Cosmological Argument” in Metaphysics (Westview, 2002), pp. 115-133.

14.

Brian Leftow, “A Leibnizian Cosmological Argument” Philosophical Studies 57 (1989), pp. 135-155. The explanandum in Leftow’s paper is abstract objects, so could be seen as a type of conceptualist argument as well. Stephen T. Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God” Philosophia Christi 2 (1999). I can’t recommend more highly Alexander Pruss’s “Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments,” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 24-100.

15.

Book-length treatments are Bede Rundle’s critical, Why there Is Something rather than Nothing (Oxford, 2004) and Pruss’s defense, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006). Two good article treatments are Pruss, “Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: Arguments New and Old for the Principle of Sufficient Reason” (2002); “A Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Cosmological Argument” Religious Studies 40 (2004), pp. 165–179.

16.

Brian Leftow, “A Modal Cosmological Argument” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24 (1988), pp. 159-88. Richard Gale & Alexander Pruss, “A New Cosmological Argument” Religious Studies 35 (1999), 461–476.

17.

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, ed. 2004), pp. 133-152.



18.

The literature here is truly inexhaustible. Good anthologies include Neil Manson (ed.), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (Routledge, 2003). For Manson’s introductory chapter, see his “Introduction to God and Design” pp. 1-23. For an updated version of Elliot Sober’s chapter in the volume (pp. 27-54), which is a critical assessment, see his “The Design Argument.” J. P. Moreland (ed.), The Creation Hypothesis: Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer (IVP, 1994). William Dembski (ed.), Mere Creation (IVP, 1998). Other overviews of deign arguments are Del Ratzsch’s entry “Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Beebe’s “The Design Argument for the Existence of God,” and the penultimate draft of Trent Dougherty & Ted Poston’s “A User’s Guide to Design Arguments,” published in Religious Studies 44 (2008), 99-110. See also Swinburne’s “The Argument from Design,” which appears to have been originally published in Philosophy 43 (1968), pp. 199-212. A much more technical presentation is ch 8, “Teleological Arguments” of his The Existence of God (Oxford, ed. 2004), pp. 153-191.

19.

J. P. Moreland has a commendable typology of design phenomena in Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity (Baker, ed. 2004), pp. 43-75.

20.

See note 58.



21.

Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Current Issues in Teleology (UPA, 1986). Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, & George Lauder (Eds.), Nature’s Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology (MIT, 1998), especially ch. 10. Mark Bedau, “Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991), pp. 647-57. See Colin Allen’s “Teleological Notions in Biology” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For design as sense and cognition, see note 47.

22.

Stephen C. Meyer, “DNA and the Origin of Life: Information, Specification, and Explanation,” in Darwinism, Design, and Public Education (2007), pp. 223-285; “An Inference to the Best Explanation for the Origin of Biological Information,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 1/4 (1998), pp. 519-556. Walter Bradley and Charles Thaxton, “Information and the Origin of Life” in J. P. Moreland, The Creation Hypothesis (IVP, 1994), pp. 173-210. See also the tour de force, The Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories (Lewis & Stanley, 1992) by Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley, Roger L. Olsen. Alexander Pruss, “Programs, Bugs, DNA and a Design Argument,” Ch. 4 in Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave Macmillan 2009).

23.

Much relevant literature here can be found in the aforementioned anthologies. Systematic book treatments are Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press, ed. 2003). Fazale Rana, The Cell’s Design (Baker, 2008). Michael Denton, Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe (The Free Press, 1998). Stephen C. Meyer, “Evidence for Design in Physics and Biology: From the Origin of the Universe to the Origin of Life,” in Michael Behe, William A. Dembski, and Stephen C. Meyer, Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe: The Proceedings of the Wethersfield Institute (Ignatius, 2001), pp. 53-111. Walter Bradley, “Is There Scientific Evidence for the Existence of God? How the Recent Discoveries Support a Designed Universe.”


24.

Again, much relevant literature here can be found in the aforementioned anthologies. Important books are John Leslie, Universes (Routledge, ed. 1996). John Barrow and Frank Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford, 1986). See William Lane Craig’s review essay, “Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1988), pp.389-395, and his “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle” in his The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (Edwin Mellen, 1990), pp. 127-153. Rob Collins is pioneering work in the area of fine-tuning. See especially his “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in Craig & Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 202-281; “The Case for Cosmic Design,” in Paul Draper (ed.) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (Online book, 2007-2008); “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning” and “The Evidence of Fine-tuning.”

25.

William Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities (Cambridge, 1998). See William Lane Craig’s positive review “The Design Inference” Human Events (July 23, 1999), p. 16. Aimed at a more general audience is Dembski’s “Detecting Design in the Natural Sciences,” and a more detailed defense is his “Logical Underpinnings of Intelligent Design” in (co-ed., Michael Ruse) Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (Cambridge, 2003).

26.

On the moral argument in general, see Peter Byrne, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Robert Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief,” in The Virtue of Faith (Oxford, 1987), pp. 144-163. Paul Copan, “The Moral Argument” in Paul Copan & Paul K. Moser (eds.), The Rationality of Theism, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 149-74. Mark Linville, “The Moral Argument” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 391-448. Christopher A. Shrock, “Three Flavors of Moral Argument for the Existence of God.”

27.

Many of the books and articles cited here provide arguments for the justification of belief in and objectivity of morality, but here are two direct treatments: Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford, 2003). Richard Swinburne, “The Objectivity of Morality,” Philosophy 51 (1976), pp. 5-20.

28.

Although many of the works cited here provide accounts of justifying belief in moral facts, a specific way of doing this that deserves mention is developed by Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, 2004) and, most excellently, Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). See also William Lad Sessions, “Coherence, Proper Basicality and Moral Arguments for Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (1987), pp. 119-137. This line of thought is also taken up by Copan and Linville.

29.

Douglas R. Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Theodicy (Temple, 1993). Gordon Graham, Evil and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, 2001).

30

A good survey here is John Hare’s God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Oxford, 2006). See also Hare’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “Religion and Morality.” Books that argue for such a connection are Philip Quinn, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford, 1978); Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford, 2002). William J. Wainwright, Religion and Morality (Aldershot, 2005). An essential article is George Mavrodes, “Religion and the Queerness of Morality,” in Robert Audi & William J. Wainwright (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Cornell, 1986), pp. 213-226. A Nice summary of Mavrodes’ argument is “Mavrodes, ‘Religion and the Queerness of Morality.’” A more general approach is Michael Murray, “Do Objective Ethical Norms Need Theistic Grounding?”.
31.

William Lane Craig, “The Indispensability of Theological Meta-ethical Foundations for Morality,” Foundations 5 (1997), pp. 9-12. Stephen C. Layman, “God and the Moral Order,” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 304-16. John Hare, “Is There an Evolutionary Foundation for Human Morality?” in Philip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss (eds.), Evolution and Ethics (Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 187-203. Michael Rea, “Naturalism and Moral Realism” in Thomas Crisp, David VanderLaan, & Matthew Davidson (eds.), Knowledge and Reality (Kluwer, 2006), pp. 215-242. James M. Sias III, Naturalism and Moral Realism (MA Thesis, 2007). Linda Zagzebski, “Does Ethics Need God?”, Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), pp. 294-303.

32.

Gregory Ganssle, “Necessary Moral Truths and the Need for Explanation,” Philosophia Christi 2 (2000), pp. 105-12. Paul Copan, “God, Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality,” in Robert Stewart (ed.), The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath and Daniel Dennett in Dialogue (Fortress, 2008), 141-161; “Is Michael Martin a Moral Realist? Sic et Non,” Philosophia Christi 2 (1999), pp. 45-72; “Atheistic Goodness Revisited: A Personal Reply to Michael Martin,” Philosophia Christi 2/1 (2000), pp. 91-104; “Morality and Meaning Without God: Another Failed Attempt,” Philosophia Christi 6/1 (2004), pp. 295-304.

33.

One of the finest critiques, which is both philosophically informed and generally accessible, is Paul Copan’s True for You but Not for Me (Bethany House, revised ed. 2009). On a more popular level, see Francis Beckwith & Gregory Koukl, Relativism (Baker, 1998). Francis Beckwith, “Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist,” in Norman Geisler & Paul Hoffman Why I am a Christian (Baker, 2001), pp. 15-29. Peter Kreeft, A Refutation of Moral Relativism (Ignatius, 1999); “A Refutation of Moral Relativism,” audio and transcript. A good philosophical anthology is Paul Moser & Thomas Carson (eds.), Moral Relativism: A Reader (Oxford, 2001). See especially chapters 9 & 10. For a good summary of problems with moral relativism, see Lewis Vaughn, Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning and Contemporary Issues (W.W. Norton & Co, 2007).

34.

See William Sorely, Moral Values and the Idea of God (Cambridge, 1918). Illtyd Trethowan, Absolute Value: A Study in Christian Theism (Humanities, 1970). Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford, 2002). J. P. Moreland, “The Ethical Inadequacy of Naturalism,” Promise (May/June 1996), pp. 36-39. More developed is his The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (SCM, 2009), pp. 143-164. Stuart Hackett, “The Value Dimension of the Cosmos: A Moral Argument” in William Lane Craig (ed.), Philosophy of Religion (Rutgers, 2002), pp. 149-154. Philip Quinn, “On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons” in Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford, 2007), pp. 237-260. Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliafero, Naturalism (Eerdmans, 2008), ch. 4.

35.

Terrence Cuneo, The Normative Web (Oxford, 2007) and Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity (Oxford, 2007). Both Cuneo and Wedgwood argue that there are irreducible normative facts, which entails moral realism (objectivity).

36.

On Altruism, see Colin Grant, Altruism & Christian Ethics (Cambridge, 2000). Jeffery Schloss, “Evolutionary Accounts of Altruism & the Problem of Goodness by Design” in William Dembski (ed.), Mere Creation (IVP, 1998), pp. 236-261. Alexander Pruss, “Altruism, Teleology, and God” (2005).

37.

The variety of approaches to and authors on the ontological argument makes it hard to narrow down the most important contributions. The sixties saw an explosion of literature on the ontological argument. Three books that came out of that decade are Alvin Plantinga (ed.), The Ontological Argument: From St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Doubleday Anchor, 1965). Charles Harthshorne, Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-examination of the Ontological Argument for God’s Existence (Open Court, 1965). John Hick & Arthur McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument: Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (Wipf & Stock, 2009 reprint of 1967 ed.). Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument (Macmillan, 1972).Much more recently is Graham Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge, 2007). Kevin Harrelson, The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel (Humanity, 2008). For a very extensive historical and contemporary bibliography, see Raul Corazzon’s page, “History of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God.” See also Graham Oppy’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “Ontological Arguments” as well as Kenneth Einar Himma’s “The Ontological Argument” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A Highly recommended paper is John Baggaley, “The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God.”

38.

Some technical papers sympathetic to Anselm’s argument include: Norman Malcolm, “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments,” Philosophical Review 69 (1960), pp. 41-62. Robert Adams, “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Argument,” Philosophical Review 80 (1971), pp. 28-54. Paul Oppenheimer & Edward Zalta, “On the Logic of the Ontological Argument” in Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), pp. 509-29; “Reflections on the Logic of the Ontological Argument,” Studia Neoaristotelica 4 (2007), pp. 28-35.

39.

E.g., Lawrence Nolan, “Descartes Ontological Argument” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


40.

Peter van Inwagen, “Necessary Being: The Ontological Argument” in Metaphysics (Westview, 2002), pp. 91-114. Stephen Davis, “The Ontological Argument” in Paul Copan & Paul K. Moser (eds.), The Rationality of Theism, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 93-111. William Lane Craig’s “The Ontological Argument” in To Everyone An Answer (IVP, 2004), pp. 124-137 is very accessible, which focuses on Plantinag’s version. Brian Leftow, “The ontological Argument” in William Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Oxford, 2007), pp. 80-115. Jason Megill and Joshua Mitchell, “A Modest Modal Ontological Argument” Ratio 22/3 (2009), 338-349.

41.

Alvin Plantinga, “The Ontological Argument” from God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974). Plantinga’s most developed version appears in The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974), pp. 196-221. A unique defense of the main possibility premise in Platinga’s S5 ontological argument is Alexander Pruss, “The Ontological Argument and the Motivational Centres of Lives,” Religious Studies 46 (2010), 233-249.

42.

Robert Maydole, “A Modal Model for Proving the Existence of God,” American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980), pp. 135-142; “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” Philo 6 (2003), pp. 299-313. “The Ontological Argument,” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 553-592.

43.

E.g., Alexander Pruss, “A Gödelian Ontological Argument Improved,” Religious Studies 45/3 (2009), pp. 347-353. James Baird, “God and Gödel: Gödelian Incompleteness in Mathematics and the Confirmation of Theism,” (1997). C. A. Anderson, “Some Emendations of Gödel’s Ontological Proof,” Faith and Philosophy 7 (1990), 291-303. Robert Koons, “Sobel on Gödel’s Ontological Proof” Philosophia Christi 8 (2006), 235-247. See also Robert Maydole’s treatment of Gödel in “The Ontological Argument” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 574-580.


44.

Many of the arguments in the following footnotes are concisely analyzed in James Anderson’s fine article, “If Knowledge then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til,” Calvin Theological Journal (2005). James Anderson, “The Theistic Preconditions of Knowledge: A Thumbnail Sketch, ” (2006). Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” in Craig & Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (Routeledge, 2000), ch. 2.

45.

First proposed in chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, “Naturalism Defeated” (Cornell, 1993). See also his draft “An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.” A helpful volume is James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Cornell, 2002). A revised version of the EAAN appears in Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford, 2000), pp. 227-40. Plantinga’s latest statements and defenses are: Alvin Plantinga, “Naturalism vs. Evolution: a Religion/Science Conflict?” in Paul Draper (ed.) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (Online book, 2007-2008); Alvin Plantinga & Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Oxford, 2008); Plantinga “Content and Natural Selection,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming). See also Omar Mirza, “A User’s Guide to the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies 141/2 (2008), pp. 125-146; especially Troy Nunley, A Defense of Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Dissertation, 2005).

46.

Victor Reppert, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason (IVP, 2003); Philosophia Christi 5/1 (2003): Symposium on The Argument from Reason; “The Argument from Reason” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 344-390; “The Argument from Reason,” (1998).

47.

See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford, 1993), especially Ch. 11. Alvin Plantinga & Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Oxford, 2008), pp. 20-30. One of the best presentations of the argument from proper function is in James Anderson’s, “If Knowledge then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til,” Calvin Theological Journal (2005).


48.

J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge, 2008); “The Argument from Consciousness,” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 282-234. See his popular summary, “Argument from Consciousness.” Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, ed. 2004), pp. 192-212. For a less technical version, see his Is There A God? (Oxford, 1996), pp. 69-94. Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge, 2005). Stuart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro, “An Argument from Consciousness and Free Will,” in Paul Draper (ed.) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (Online book, 2007-2008). Robert Adams, “Falvors, Colors, and God” in The Virstue of Faith (Oxford, 1987), pp. 243-262. Adams calls his argument “a version of the argument from consciousness,” but it is essentially the argument from qualia for dualism presented as an argument for theism. A recent book critiquing materialism from a broad range of issues, prominently consciousness, is Robert Koons and George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism (Oxford, 2010).

49.

Book-length defenses include: John Foster, The Immaterial Self (Routeledge, 1996). Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliafero, Naturalism (Eerdmans, 2008). William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Cornell, 2001). David Lund, The Conscious Self: The Immaterial Center of Subjective States (Humanity, 2005). J. P. Moreland & Scott Rae, Body & Soul (IVP, 2000). Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford, revised edition 1997). More theological is John Cooper’s Body, Soul, & Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthrolology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Eerdmans, 1989). Anthologies include: Joel Green & Stuart Palmer, In Search of the Soul (IVP, 2005). John Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case For Dualism (Charlottesville, 1989). Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford, 2007). Representing more materialist perspectives is Warren Brown, Nancey Murphy, & H. Newton Malony (eds.), Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Fortress, 1998). A tidy overview of a case that can be made for substance dualism can be found in Moreland & Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP, 2003), pp. 228-246. Also for an accessible overview, see Scott Brisbane, “Case for Dualism” and John DePoe, “A Defense of Dualism.” Excellent papers defending dualism include: Brian Leftow, “Souls Dipped in Dust” in Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons (Cornell, 2001), 120-138. John Foster, “A Defense of Dualism” in The Case For Dualism (Charlottesville, 1989), pp. 1-23. Keith Yandell, “A Defense of Dualism,” Faith and Philosophy 12/4 (1995), pp. 548-566. Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” Faith and Philosophy 23/1 (2006), pp. 3-32. William G. Lycan, “Giving Dualism Its Due,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2008). For a thorough introduction including arguments pro and con, see Howard Robinson, “Dualism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Dean Zimmerman, “Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind” Encyclopedia of Philosophy (MacMillan, 2nd edition), pp. 113-122; Scott Calef, “Dualism and Mind” in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Important naturalistic accounts of dualism are David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford, 1996). Though Chalmers might object to being called a full-fledged dualist, his arguments for the irreducibility of consciousness are important. One might also include Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton, 2005), where he concedes the irreducibility of qualia. For discussions on naturalists who defend dualisms, see William Lycan, “Recent Naturalistic Dualisms,” (2007) and Yujin Nagasawa, “Australian Dualisms.” These “naturalistic dualisms” receive severe chastisements from William Hasker, “How Not to be a Reductivist,” Progress in Complexity, Intelligence, and Design 2/3 (2003) and J. P. Moreland, “If You Can’t Reduce, You Must Eliminate: Why Kim’s Version of Physicalism isn’t Close Enough,” Philosophia Christi 7 (2005), pp. 463-473; Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routeledge, 2008). On arguments for life after death, see J. P. Moreland & Gary Habermas, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wipf & Stock, ed. 2004). William Hasker, “Afterlife,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

50.

Most philosophical defenses of dualism include a priori arguments. See especially Plantinga, Swinburne, and Yandell, on concievability arguments.


51.

A nice overview is J. P. Moreland & Gary Habermas, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wipf & Stock, ed. 2004), in which both a priori and a posteriori arguments are presented.
52.

Robert Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo Meyering, & Michael A. Arbib (eds.), Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame, 2000). Joel Green, What About the Soul? Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology (Abingdon, ed. 2004) Mario Beauregard & Mario Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul (Harper, ed. 2008). See especially Angus Menuge, “Is Downward Causation Possible? How the Mind Can Make a Physical Difference,” Philosophia Christi 11/1 (2009), pp. 93-110 and the literature cited therein. Andrew Clifton “An Empirical Case Against Materialism,” AntiMatters 3/2 (2009), pp. 65-98.

53.

One of the best studies of NDEs as evidence against naturalism is chapters 7-9 of J. P. Moreland & Gary Habermas, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wipf & Stock, ed. 2004).

54.

Robert Koons, “The Incompatibility of Naturalism and Scientific Realism” and Michael Rea, “Naturalism and Material Objects” in Craig & Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (Routeledge, 2000), chs. 3, & 5. Michael Rea’s chapter is a condensed version of his most excellent book, A World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford, 2004). A good discussion of Rea’s argument is his “Naturalism and Ontology: A Reply to Dale Jacquette,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005), pp. 343-357.

55.

See Alvin Plantinga, “How To Be an Anti-Realist,” APA Proceedings and Addresses 56/1 (1982), pp. 47-70. Michael Rea, “Theism and Epistemic Truth-Equivalences,” Noûs 34/2 (2000), pp. 291–301.

56.

Quentin Smith, “The Conceptualist Argument for God’s Existence,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 38-49. Alvin Platninga, “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” section I arguments (a)-(c), pp. 210-213 in Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge, 2007). John Byl, “Theism and Mathematical Realism,” Proceedings of the Association of Christians in the Mathematical Sciences (2001), pp. 33-48. See especially the work of Richard Brian Davis, who is pioneering work in this area: “God and Modal Concretism,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008), pp. 37-54; “The Conceptualist Argument: A New Defense,” (forthcoming). For a defense of the coherence of grounding abstracta in God, see Greg Welty, An Examination of Theistic Conceptual Realism as an Alternative to Theistic Activism (Oxford, 2000). Richard Brian Davis, The Metaphysics of Theism and Modality (Peter Lang, 2001).

57.

J. P. Moreland, “Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties,” in Craig & Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (Routeledge, 2000), ch. 4. Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Harvard, 2002). Russell Howell, “Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problem for Naturalism?” (2005). Arguments here are independent of but buttressed by the conceptualist argument and vice versa.

58.
John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God (Oxford, 2004), book based on his “Regularities, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001), pp. 145-161. Del Ratzsch, “Nomo(theo)logical Necessity,” Faith and Philosophy 4/3 (1987), pp. 83-402. Richard Swinburne, “Relations Between Universals, or Divine Laws?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84/2 (2006), pp. 179-189. Good but a bit dated is F. R. Tennant, “Theism and Laws of Nature,” The Harvard Theological Review 17/4 (1924), pp. 375-391. Nancy Cartwright, “No God, No Laws.”

59.

Ronney Mourad, Transcendental Arguments and Justified Christian Belief (University Press of America, 2005). Stuart Hackett, The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation Claim (Baker, 1984), pp. 90-96. Hackett calls his argument “a conceptual argument,” but it more closely resembles the transcendental argument. Sebastian Heck, “Transcendental Arguments in Apologetics – The Current State of Affairs,” (2005). One of best analyses of transcendental arguments, in addition to some of the aforementioned epistemological arguments, is James Anderson, “If Knowledge then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til,” Calvin Theological Journal (2005). Very thorough is Michael R. Butler, “The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence.” John Frame, “Transcendental Arguments.” A handy outline of the argument is provided by Matt Slick, “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God.”

60.

Before the argument became hot in recent analytic philosophy, there was William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience (19902) and Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy (1917). Among more recent book-length defenses are William Alston, Percieving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Corness, 1991). Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge, 1993). Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford, 1999). Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief (Cornell, 1997). Jerome Gellman, Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry (Ashgate, 2002). Most defenses of this argument are indebted to Richard Swinburne, “The Argument from Religious Experience,” ch. 13 in The Existence of God (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2004), pp. 293-327. A shortened version is his “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience” in Arthur Peacocke (ed.), The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century (Notre Dame, ed. 1986), pp. 182-196. One of the best overall synopses I’ve read is in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, & David Basinger (eds.), Reason & Religious Belief (Oxford, 2nd ed. 1998), pp. 18-42. Accordingly, a good collection of essays on the topic is in their companion, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2001), pp. 5-64. A nice presentation is also given by C. Stephen Layman, Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God (Oxford, 2007), pp. 38-78. For some of the recent history and defensive strategies, see Kai-man Kwan, “Can Religious Experience Provide Justification for the Belief in God? The Debate in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy” Philosophy Compass 1/6 (2006), pp. 640–661. Two of the best systematic defenses are Douglas Geivett, “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience,” in Paul Copan & Paul Moser (eds.), The Rationality of Theism (Routeledge, 2003). Kai-man Kwan, “The Argument from Religious Experience,” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 498-552. See also William Alston, “The Experiential Basis of Theism,” (2002). Alexander Pruss, “A Religious Experience Argument for the Existence of a Holy Transcendent Being,” (2001). Travis Dumsday, “Neuroscience and the Evidential Force of Religious Experience,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008), pp. 137-163.

61.

Jeff Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments for Believing in God,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


62.

Worthwhile books include Nicholas Rescher, Pascal’s Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, 1985). The best collection of essays is found in Jeff Jordan (ed.), Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager (Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). See Kelly James Clark’s review, “Gambling on God” in Perspectives (1995), pp. 30-31. Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God (Oxford, 2006). See too Jordan’s entry “Pascal’s Wager,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Noteworthy articles, aside from the collection in Gambling on God, are: Richard Swinburne, “The Christian Wager,” Religious Studies 4 (1969), pp. 217–228. Thomas V. Morris, “Pascalian Wagering,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986), pp. 437–454. William Lycan and George Schlesinger, “You Bet Your Life: Pascal’s Wager Defended,” in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason and Responsibility (Wadsworth, 7th ed., 1989). Alexander Tabarrok, “Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I got a Deal for You!” Theory and Decision 48/2 (2000), pp. 123-128. Robert Peterson, “Pascal’s Wager: Logical Consistency and Usefulness as an Argument for the Existence of God,” Global Journal of Classical Theology 5/1 (2005). Joel Esala, “The Epistemology of Pascal’s Wager: A Christian Presuppositional Argument,” Reformed Perspectives Magazine 8/2 (2006). Though more similar to a Jamesian-style pragmatic argument, see Stephen T. Davis, “Pascal on Self-Caused Belief,” Religious Studies 27 (1991), pp. 27-37.

63.
A systematic defense of the Jamesian wager is Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God (Oxford, 2006), pp. 164-187. L. Stafford Betty, “Going beyond James: A Pragmatic Argument for God’s Existence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001), pp. 69–84. Sami Pihlström, “Pragmatic and Transcendental Arguments for Theism: A Critical Examination,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 51/3 (2002). Philip Quinn, “Gale on a Pragmatic Argument for Religious Belief,” Philo 6/1 (2003). Mill’s wager, also discussed in Jordan (pp. 187ff), is similar to what is called “the presumption of theism” below.

64.

Robert Koons, “Faith, Probability, and Infinite Passion,” Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp. 145-160.


65.
Thomas Morris, Making Sense of It All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life (Eerdmans, 1992). An excellent collection of essays is E. D. Klemke (ed.), The Meaning of Life (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2000). William Lane Craig, “The Absurdity of Life Without God,” from Reasonable Faith (Crossway 1994), pp. 51-75. J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Baker, 2004), pp. 115-132. Jerry Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (Oxford, 2002), especially ch. 7, “Heaven, Morality, and the Meaning of Life.” Important articles include: Michael Levine, “What Does Death Have to Do with the Meaning of Life?” Religious Studies 23 (1987), pp. 457-465. Phillip Quinn, “How Christianity Secures Life’s Meanings,” in J. Runzo & N. Martin (eds.), The Meaning of Life in the World Religions (Oxford, 2000), pp. 53-68. Thaddeus Metz, “The Immortality Requirement for Life’s Meaning” Ration 16/2 (2003), pp. 161-177. Jacob Affolter, “Human nature as God’s purpose,” Religious Studies 43 (2007), pp. 443–455. A helpful summary of a lot of the issues involved in the question of the meaning of life is Thaddeus Metz, “The Meaning of Life” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


66.

The best work on this is John Oller Jr. & John Omdahl, “Origin of the Human Language Capacity: In Whose Image?” in J. P. Moreland (ed.), The Creation Hypothesis (IVP, 1994), pp. 235-269. Jeffery Johnson & Joyclynn Potter, “The Argument from Language and the Existence of God,” Journal of Religion 85/1 (2005), pp. 83-93. James Bohn, “Beyond the fire of Prometheus: The capacity for human speech: Empirical evidence of the Image of God,” Quodlibet Journal 4/2-3 (2002). And, for reference’s sake, Brad Harrub, Dave Miller, & Bert Thompson, “The Origin of Language and Communication,” Reason & Revelation 22/8 (2002), pp. 57-63, though I hasten to disassociate with anything related AIG or ICR.


67.

Good but brief treatments are J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Baker, 2004), pp. 48-49. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 2nd ed., 2004), pp. 190-191. More extensive philosophical treatments appear in Donald Wayne Viney, “The Aesthetic Argument,” ch. 9 of Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God (SUNY, 1985), pp. 119-128. Mark Wynn, “Providence and Beauty,” ch. 1 in God and Goodness: A Natural Theological Perspective (Routelegde, 1999), pp. 11-36. Many hark back to F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology Vol. 2. (Cambridge, 1930). Excellent, though not especially technical are: Thomas Dubay, The Evidential Power of Beauty: Science and Theology Meet (Ignatius, 1999). Benjamin Wiker & Jonathan Witt, A Meaningful World: How the Arts and Sciences Reveal the Genius of Nature (IVP, 2006). For beauty as a theodicy, see Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford ), pp. 49-53. Alexander Pruss, “The Cosmos as a Work of Art,” (2004). One of the finest treatments is Peter Williams, “Aesthetic Arguments for the Existence of God,” Quodlibet Journal 3/3 (2001). Eleonore Stump, “Beauty as a Road to God,” Sacred Music 134/4 (2007), 11-24.. A common premise in the argument from beauty asserts the existence of objective beauty, a book-length defense of which is Eddy M. Zemach’s Real Beauty (Penn State , 1997). Though unpublished, Jim Speigel has some good thoughts on the argument from beauty in a series of posts entitled, “An Anti-Naturalist Argument from Beauty” and “Why Beauty is an Objective Quality in the World.” Russell Howell, “Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problem for Naturalism?” (2005).

68.

See Alexander Pruss’s interesting but brief thoughts in “The Ontological Argument from Desire”

69.

See Douglas Groothuis’s two articles, “Deposed Royalty: Pascal’s Anthropological Argument,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 41/2 (1998); “A Royal Ruin: Pascal’s Argument from Humanity to Christianity.” See also Robert Verlarde, “Greatness and Wretchedness: The Usefulness of Pascal’s Anthropological Argument in Apologetics.”

70.

Alexander Pruss, “Samkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001), pp. 111–120. T. Ryan Byerly, “The Ontomystical Argument Revisited,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming).



71.

Jan Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, “Free Agency and Materialism,” in Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom and Rationality (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 47-71. J. P. Moreland, “Naturalism and Libertarian Agency” Philosophy and Theology 10/2 (1997), pp. 353-383; “The Explanatory Relevance of Libertarian Agency as a Model of Theistic Design,” in William Dembski (ed.), Mere Creation (IVP, 1998), pp. 265-288. Stewart Goetz, “Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,” in Craig & Moreland (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (Routledge, 2000), pp. 156-186. Stuart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro, “An Argument from Consciousness and Free Will,” in Paul Draper (ed.) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (Online book, 2007-2008).



72.

Edwin Yamauchi, The Stones and the Scriptures (IVP, 1973). Walter Kaiser, The Old Testament Documents: Are They Reliable & Relevant? (IVP, 2001). K. A. Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Eerdmans, 2003).



73.

Bruce M. Metzger, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration (Oxford, 1964). John A. T Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament? (Eerdmans, 1977). Paul Barnett, Is the New Testament History? (Servant Publications, 1986). F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? (IVP, 1982). Colin Hermer, & Conrad H. Gempf, The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History (Eisenbrauns, 1990). A wonderful resource is Darren Hewer, The Historical Reliability of the New Testament (2nd Ed., 2010). For a nice general overview, see J. P. Moreland, “The Historicity of the New Testament,” ch 5 of Scaling the Secular City (Baker, 1987), 133-157.



74.

Craig Blomberg, Jesus and the Gospels (Broadman and Holman, 1997). Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels (IVP, ed. 2007); The Historical Reliability of John’s Gospel (Apollos, 2001). Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Eerdmans, 2006).



75.




76.




77

Some of the better resources here are the following (and the bibliographical materials therein): F. F. Bruce, Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974). Gary Habermas, Gary Habermas, “Ancient non-Christian Sources” ch 9 of The Historical Evidence: Ancient Evidence for the Life of Christ (College Press, 1996), 187-228. Robert E. Van Voorst, Jesus Outside the New Testament: An Introduction to the Ancient Evidence (Eerdmans, 2000). Edwin M. Yamauchi, “Jesus Outside the New Testament: What is the Evidence?” in Michael Wilkins & J. P. Moreland (eds.), Jesus Under Fire (Zondervan, 1995), 207-229. See “Jesus Outside the Bible,” Part II of Craig Evans (ed.), The Historical Jesus: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies (Routledge, 2004), especially Evans’ article, “Jesus in non-Christian Sources,” pp. 375-406.

78.

More robust treatments are: Gary Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry (Michigan State University Dissertation 1976). William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (The Edwin Mellon Press, ed. 2002). A condensed and popular treatment this study is his The Son Rises (Wipf & Stock, 2000). An excellent scholarly and up-to-date treatment is “The Resurrection of Jesus” ch 8 in Reasonable Faith (Crossway, 3rd ed.), pp. 133-407. Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Eerdmans, 1993). Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (eds.), The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus (Oxford, 1997). N. T. Wright’s magnius opum, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress Press, 2003). Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford, 2003). One of the more philosophically sophisticated and thorough treatments is Timothy and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 593-662. Smaller treatments: William Lane Craig, “Contemporary Scholarship and the Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” Truth 1 (1985), pp. 89-95. Habermas, “The Case for Christ’s Resurrection” in Beckwith, Craig, and Moreland (eds.), To Everyone an Answer (IVP, 2004), pp. 180-198.


79.

David Basinger and Randall Basinger, Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary Debate (Edwin Mellen Press, 1986). Gary Habermas and Douglas Geivett (eds.), In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (IVP, 1997). Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (Macmillan 1971); Swinburne (ed.), Miracles (Prentice Hall 1989); “For the Possibility of Miracles” in Louis Pojman (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Wadsworth, 4th ed., 2003), pp. 269-275. A wonderfully balanced look at the issues is “Miracles: Does God Intervene in Earthly Affairs?” ch. 9 of Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, & David Basinger (eds.), Reason & Religious Belief (Oxford, 2nd ed. 1998), pp. 190-211. William Lane Craig, “The Problem of Miracles: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective,” In Gospel Perspectives VI (1986), pp. 9-40; A substantially updated treatment can be found in Reasonable Faith (Crossway, 3rd ed. 2008), pp. 247-283. See also Craig’s great discussion of the concept of miracle in “Creation, Providence, and Miracle,” in Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion (Georgetown University Press, 1998), pp. 136-162. John DePoe, “How to Confirm a Miracle: A Bayesian Approach” (Presented at APA Central Meeting, 2007) and “Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Confirming Miracles” Philosophia Christi 10/1 (2008), pp. 229-238. Michael Levine, “Miracles” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005). See also James Arlandson’s impressive “Bibliography of Miracles” (2007).

80.

See Peter Winebrenner Stoner and Robert C. Newman’s peer-reviewed book, Science Speaks (Moody Press; 3rd revised ed., 1969). See also Newman (ed.), The Evidence of Prophecy: Fulfilled Prediction as a Testimony to the Truth of Christianity (Interdisciplinary Biblical Research Institute, 1990). Newman, “Fulfilled Prophecy as Miracle,” in Gary Habermas and Douglas Geivett (eds.), In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (IVP, 1997), pp. 214-225. Robert C. Newman, John A. Bloom, and Hugh G. Gaugh, Jr. “Public Theology and Prophecy Data: Factual Evidence That Counts for the Biblical Worldview”, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 46:1 (2003), pp. 79-110. For a similar attempt to assign probabilities to prophecies, see Hugh Ross, “Fulfilled Prophecy: Evidence for the Reliability of the Bible”. On prophecy as design, see Gregory Koukl, “Prophecy and People: Both Designed to Fit”